In the case of Milliken et al., Executors, v. United States in 1930, the Supreme Court ruled on a matter related to estate tax law. The executors of an estate had appealed against an additional assessment made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for federal estate taxes due from their decedent's gross estate. The dispute arose over whether certain property transferred during the decedent’s lifetime was subject to inclusion in his gross taxable estate under Section 302(c) and (d) of the Revenue Act of 1926. These sections pertain to transfers intended or taking effect upon death and revocable transfers respectively. The court held that these properties were indeed part of his gross taxable estates as they were transferred with a retained life interest which meant he still had control over them until his death - thus falling within Section 302(d). Furthermore, it was determined that even if there wasn't explicit intent for these assets to be passed on after death at time they were initially transferred, since they did ultimately pass onto others post-death without any further action required by him – this fell within section 302(c). This decision clarified interpretations around transfer types included in taxable estates under existing revenue laws.

In the dissenting opinion for Milliken et al., Executors, v. United States (1930), Justice Stone argued that the majority misinterpreted both the language and intent of Congress in its application of estate tax law. He contended that a literal reading of Section 402(c) would not include gifts made by a decedent within two years prior to death without consideration as part of his gross estate unless it was intended to take effect at or after death. The majority's interpretation, he believed, expanded this definition beyond what was written into law by Congress and contradicted established principles regarding statutory construction. Furthermore, Justice Stone pointed out inconsistencies between this case’s ruling and previous rulings on similar cases where transfers were deemed complete when there remained no power in the donor to revest beneficial interest in himself. In conclusion, he disagreed with imposing an additional tax burden based on speculative assumptions about legislative intent rather than clear legal text.