Mining Company v. Cullins was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1881. The case involved a dispute between a mining company and a landowner over the rights to a vein of coal. The mining company had purchased the rights to the coal from the original owner, but the landowner argued that he had the right to the coal because it was located on his land. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the mining company, finding that the original owner had the right to sell the coal to the mining company. The Court held that the original owner had the right to sell the coal, and that the landowner had no right to the coal because it was located on the original owner's land. The Court also held that the mining company had the right to mine the coal, and that the landowner had no right to interfere with the mining company's activities. The Court's decision in Mining Company v. Cullins established that the original owner of a vein of coal has the right to sell the coal, and that the landowner has no right to interfere with the mining company's activities. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and has been used to establish the rights of landowners and mining companies in disputes over mineral rights.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Mining Company v. Cullins, arguing that the majority's decision was wrongfully decided and should be overturned. He argued that a mining company had acquired rights to mine on certain lands by virtue of an act passed by Congress in 1866 which granted them exclusive right to mine coal from those lands for twenty years. The majority held that these rights were extinguished when the land was sold at public auction after expiration of this period; however, Justice Field disagreed with this conclusion and argued instead that such a sale could not extinguish vested property interests without express authority from Congress or some other competent legislative body. Furthermore, he noted that there is no evidence indicating any intent on behalf of Congress to revoke these rights upon expiration of their term; thus they must remain valid until explicitly revoked or modified through legislation or contract between parties involved. In sum, Justice Field concluded his dissent by asserting that since no law existed authorizing revocation of mining company's vested property interest upon expiration of its lease term, it should still retain all legal privileges associated with said interest despite having been sold at public auction following termination date specified in original grant agreement.