In Missionary Society v. Dalles, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a religious organization had the right to use a public street for religious services. The Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church had been using a public street in the city of Dalles, Oregon, for religious services for several years. The city of Dalles had passed an ordinance prohibiting the use of public streets for religious services. The Missionary Society argued that the ordinance violated their right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance did not violate the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city's police power to regulate the use of public streets. The Court noted that the ordinance was not aimed at religious activities, but rather at the use of public streets for any purpose. The Court also noted that the ordinance did not prevent the Missionary Society from engaging in religious activities, but merely prohibited the use of public streets for those activities. The Court concluded that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city's police power and did not violate the First Amendment. The Court held that the ordinance was a reasonable regulation of the use of public streets and did not infringe on the Missionary Society's right to free exercise of religion.

In Missionary Society v. Dalles, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a tax imposed by Oregon on property owned by a religious organization violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The majority opinion held that it did not violate any constitutional rights and that states have broad authority to impose taxes in order to raise revenue for public purposes. However, Justice Field dissented from this decision and argued that such taxation would be an unconstitutional infringement upon freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. He reasoned that if states were allowed to tax religious organizations without limitation then they could effectively control or even suppress them through excessive taxation which would constitute an impermissible burden on their free exercise rights. Furthermore, he noted that while some forms of taxation may be permissible so long as they are reasonable and nondiscriminatory, this particular tax was neither reasonable nor nondiscriminatory since it targeted only one type of institution - those associated with religion - thus making its purpose clear: to limit or restrict religious activities within Oregon's borders