Mitchell v. Tilghman was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The case arose when the plaintiff, Mitchell, sought to have the defendant, Tilghman, removed from his position as a federal judge. Mitchell argued that Tilghman had acted in a manner that was prejudicial to the interests of the United States and that he should be removed from office. The state court issued a writ of mandamus ordering Tilghman to vacate his office. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of mandamus was a remedy that was only available to the federal courts and that the state court did not have the power to issue such a writ. The Court also held that the state court did not have the authority to remove a federal judge from office. The Court concluded that the writ of mandamus issued by the state court was invalid and that Tilghman should remain in office. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court or to remove a federal judge from office. The writ of mandamus issued by the state court was invalid and Tilghman remained in office.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Mitchell v. Tilghman, arguing that the majority had incorrectly interpreted a provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. He argued that under this act, an individual who was insolvent at the time they received money from another party could not be held liable for repayment if it was proven that they were insolvent when receiving said funds. The majority opinion had instead found that such individuals would still be liable to repay any debts incurred prior to their bankruptcy filing regardless of whether or not they were solvent at the time those debts were created. Justice Field disagreed with this interpretation and argued instead for a more literal reading of the statute which he believed should protect debtors from being held responsible for pre-bankruptcy obligations if it can be shown that they were already insolvent when these obligations arose.