Term: 2018
Docket: 18-6210
Mitchell v. Wisconsin
- Pro
18-6210 MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN DECISION BELOW: 914 N.W.2d 151 CERT. GRANTED 1/11/2019 QUESTION PRESENTED: In both Missouri v. McNeely and Birchfield v. North Dakota, this Court referred approvingly to "implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply" with tests for alcohol or drugs when they have been arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. 569 U.S. at 141, 161 (2013); 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016). But a majority of states, including Wisconsin, have implied-consent laws that do something else entirely: they authorize blood draws without a warrant, without exigency, and without the assent of the motorist, under a variety of circumstances-most commonly when the motorist is unconscious. State appellate courts have sharply divided on whether such laws comport with the Fourth Amendment. The question presented is: Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2015AP304
In the case of Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a state law allowing police to draw blood from unconscious drunk-driving suspects without obtaining a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for drunk driving in Sheboygan County, Wisconsin; he became unconscious en route to the hospital where his blood was drawn without a warrant under Wisconsin’s implied consent law which presumes that drivers have consented to such tests by virtue of operating on public roads within the state. The court ruled 5-4 in favor of upholding this provision as it falls under an exception for exigent circumstances - situations that require swift action to prevent imminent danger or serious damage to evidence before a warrant can be obtained.
In the dissenting opinion for Mitchell v. Wisconsin, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the majority's decision to allow warrantless blood draws from unconscious drunk-driving suspects was a significant expansion of previous rulings and an erosion of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. She contended that such a broad exception to the requirement for consent or a warrant could be exploited in other contexts beyond drunk driving cases. Furthermore, she disagreed with the majority's assertion that implied consent laws create actual consent, arguing instead they merely impose penalties for refusal to submit to testing. In her view, this does not equate to free and voluntary agreement - which is necessary for valid consent under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
