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08-678 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. V. CARPENTER DECISION BELOW:541 F.3d 1048 CERT. GRANTED 1/26/2009 QUESTIONS PRESENTED: Whether a party has an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine, as set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), of a district court's order finding waiver of the attorney-client privilege and compelling production of privileged materials. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-15208-GG, 07-15691-GG
In the 2009 case Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Norman Carpenter, the United States Supreme Court ruled on whether a corporation could be considered a person under federal law for purposes of conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The plaintiffs were employees who alleged that Mohawk Industries conspired with recruiting agencies to suppress wages by hiring undocumented workers. The issue was whether or not corporations could be both the "person" and "enterprise" in an association-in-fact enterprise under RICO's definitions section. In a unanimous decision, the court held that while corporations can indeed be liable as persons under RICO, they cannot simultaneously qualify as both person and enterprise within an association-in-fact enterprise defined by Section 1961(4) of RICO statute; hence it rejected plaintiff’s claim against Mohawk industries.
In the dissenting opinion for Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Norman Carpenter (2009), Justice Breyer argued that a corporation can be considered an individual under RICO law and thus could conspire with its employees to violate this law. He reasoned that corporations are often treated as individuals in legal contexts, and there is no reason why they should not be seen as such under RICO. Furthermore, he contended that the majority's interpretation of the statute was too narrow and failed to consider Congress' intent when it enacted RICO - which was to provide new weapons of deterrence against organized crime groups by establishing severe criminal penalties for their actions. By excluding corporations from being potential conspirators in these crimes, Justice Breyer believed the court undermined this legislative purpose.