Monger v. Shirley was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Monger, was held in a federal prison in the District of Columbia. Monger sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which was denied. Monger then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus was a federal power, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus was a federal power, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals.

In the case of Monger v. Shirley, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result for the plaintiff. He noted that under prior decisions, when a contract is made with two parties who are not aware of each other’s interests, it should be treated as if both had knowledge of all material facts. In this case, however, the majority held that since one party did not have full knowledge at the time of contracting—in this instance regarding title to land—the contract could be voided by either party without any liability or obligation on their part. Justice Field disagreed with this conclusion and argued instead that such contracts should remain valid unless fraud or misrepresentation can be proven; otherwise innocent parties may suffer from unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. He concluded his dissent by noting how unfair it would be for someone like Monger who acted in good faith but ultimately lost out due to lack of information about another person's interest in property they were purchasing