Mont v. United States

Questions presented

SCOTUS records, cert granted 2 Nov 2018

Whether a statute directed to the administration of imprisoned individuals serves as authority to alter or suspend the running of a criminal sentence of supervised release, when such "tolling'' is without judicial action, and requires the term "imprisonment" as used in the administrative statute, to include pretrial detention prior to an adjudication of guilt. Is a district court required to exercise its jurisdiction in order to suspend the running of a supervised release sentence as directed under 18 U.S.C. §3583(i) prior to expiration of the term of supervised release, when a supervised releasee is in pretrial detention, or does 18 U.S.C. §3624 (e) toll the running of supervised release while in pretrial detention?

Opinion summary

Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion

In the case of Mont v. United States (2018), Andre Haymond was convicted for possessing child pornography and sentenced to 38 months in prison followed by a ten-year supervised release. After serving his sentence, he was found with additional illegal material during his supervised release period, which led to an additional five years imprisonment without a jury trial. The Supreme Court ruled that this violated Haymond's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as it increased his penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum based on facts not determined by a jury but rather by a judge using preponderance of evidence standard. However, Jason Mont argued that time spent in pretrial detention should be credited towards his term of federal supervised release; thus, he had completed it before committing new crimes. The court disagreed stating that unless the defendant is held because of the violation for which they were eventually convicted or if credit has been awarded against any other sentence then only can pretrial detention be counted towards completion of their term under §3624(e). Therefore, Mont’s new offenses committed while on bail fell within the original supervision period making him liable for further penalties.

Dissent summary

Etalia.ai summary of the dissenting opinions

In the dissenting opinion for Mont v. United States, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with both the text and purpose of federal supervised release law. She contended that a term of supervised release does not toll during periods of pretrial detention, as this would lead to an absurd result where defendants could serve their terms in custody rather than in society at large - which is contrary to Congress' intent when it created supervised release. Furthermore, she pointed out that such interpretation could potentially punish individuals twice for the same conduct by extending their supervision period due to unrelated criminal charges. Lastly, she criticized the majority’s reliance on administrative convenience and potential evasion of justice as reasons for its ruling because these concerns were speculative and unsupported by evidence.

Opinion written by Justice Thomas

Decided 3 Jun 2019 · Official report

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