Moore v. Huntington was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when the state of Ohio issued a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison in the state of Indiana. The prisoner, Moore, argued that the writ was invalid because the state court lacked jurisdiction over the federal prison. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus, as the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over federal prisons. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a judicial remedy, and that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over federal prisons. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy of last resort, and that the state court should not interfere with the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over federal prisons. The Court concluded that the writ of habeas corpus issued by the state court was invalid, and that the prisoner should remain in federal custody.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Moore v. Huntington, arguing that the majority had incorrectly interpreted and applied the law of Louisiana regarding mortgages on real estate. He argued that under Louisiana law, a mortgage was not extinguished by an act of sale unless it was expressly mentioned in the deed or other instrument transferring title to property; since this case did not involve any such mention, he believed that Moore's mortgage should remain valid despite his having sold his land to Huntington. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that even if there had been some ambiguity as to whether or not Moore's mortgage remained intact after selling his land, it would have been up to him - as opposed to Huntington - who held no interest in said property at the time -to prove otherwise. Ultimately, Justice Field concluded that because there were no facts presented which could lead one reasonably conclude either way with regards to whether or not Moore's mortgage still existed following its transferral from himself onto another party via an act of sale without mentioning said debt specifically within said deed/instrument transferring title over ownership rights for such property; thusly he felt compelled enough due legal precedent and logic alike so as too dissent against what he saw as a misapplication of relevant laws pertaining thereto by those justices comprising majority opinion upon this matter before us today herewith now..