In the case of Moore v. Illinois, 1977, the U.S Supreme Court ruled on whether a pretrial identification procedure violated due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant, Charles Moore was convicted for robbery based largely on an eyewitness's testimony who identified him in a police station lineup conducted without his counsel present. He appealed arguing that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and thus should have been excluded from trial evidence. However, the court held that although it was indeed a violation of Moore’s Sixth amendment rights to conduct such lineups without legal representation present; since there were other substantial grounds upon which he could be linked to the crime (including another witness), it did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment right as per due process clause because it didn't contribute significantly towards conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In the dissenting opinion for Moore v. Illinois, Justice William J. Brennan Jr., joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall and Potter Stewart, argued that the majority's decision violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a critical stage of prosecution - namely his identification in a lineup after indictment but before appointment of counsel. The dissenters contended that this was not simply an issue about reliability or fairness of evidence at trial; rather it concerned whether constitutional rights were respected during pretrial procedures. They also disagreed with the majority’s view that post-indictment lineups are not inherently suggestive and therefore do not require presence of defense counsel as safeguard against potential abuses by police or prosecutors. Furthermore, they criticized reliance on factors such as promptness and accuracy in identifying suspects without considering other relevant circumstances like suggestiveness inherent in single-person show-ups used here.