Moore v. Robbins was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in federal custody. The case arose when a prisoner, William Moore, was arrested in the state of Missouri and charged with a federal crime. Moore was then transferred to a federal prison in Illinois. Moore then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court of Missouri, arguing that he was being unlawfully detained in federal custody. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the state court had no jurisdiction over the federal prison in Illinois and thus could not issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held there. The Court's decision in Moore v. Robbins established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal custody. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases and has become an important precedent in the area of federal-state relations.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Moore v. Robbins, arguing that the majority's decision was an incorrect interpretation of the law and would lead to unjust results. He argued that under Missouri state law, a mortgagee had no right to foreclose on mortgaged property without first obtaining a judgment against the mortgagor for nonpayment of debt or interest due on it. The majority held that such foreclosure could be done without any court action whatsoever; however, Justice Field disagreed with this conclusion because he believed it violated both common-law principles and statutory provisions which required judicial proceedings before foreclosure could take place. Furthermore, he noted that if such a practice were allowed then creditors would have too much power over their debtors since they could simply seize property whenever payments were not made as agreed upon instead of having to go through legal channels first. In his view, allowing creditors to act outside of established legal procedures undermined public policy by creating uncertainty about rights and obligations between parties involved in financial transactions.