The U.S. Supreme Court case Morgan v. Devine in 1914 revolved around the issue of whether a prisoner could be tried and convicted for a crime committed while serving time in federal prison, without being physically present at his trial. The defendant, Devine, was charged with murder after killing another inmate during an altercation within the penitentiary where he was incarcerated. He argued that his constitutional rights were violated because he wasn't transported to the state court for trial but instead remained confined in federal custody throughout proceedings. However, the Supreme Court ruled against him stating that there is no absolute right under either common law or constitution requiring presence of accused at all stages of prosecution; it depends on circumstances and nature of offense charged as well as stage of proceedings when absence occurs. In this case, they found no violation since Devine had been represented by counsel who cross-examined witnesses and presented evidence on his behalf during trial despite his physical absence from courtroom due to security concerns related to transporting prisoners between jurisdictions.

In the dissenting opinion for Morgan v. Devine, Justice Holmes argued that the petitioner's right to due process was not violated by his inability to cross-examine a witness during his trial. He contended that while it is generally true that an accused has a right to confront witnesses against him, this principle does not apply when the testimony in question is merely corroborative and its exclusion would not have altered the outcome of the case. In such instances, he believed there should be some flexibility in applying procedural rules so as not to unduly burden courts or impede justice. Furthermore, he noted that any error made by admitting such evidence without allowing cross-examination could have been corrected on appeal rather than through habeas corpus proceedings.