Morgan v. Eggers was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Morgan, was held in a federal prison in Illinois. Morgan sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Morgan v. Eggers, arguing that the majority had misinterpreted a provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and thus failed to recognize Congress' intent when passing it. He argued that Section 57a was meant to provide relief for debtors who were unable to pay their debts due to circumstances beyond their control, such as an economic downturn or illness. The majority's interpretation would deny this relief by allowing creditors to collect on debts even if they could not prove any wrongdoing on behalf of the debtor. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that Congress had specifically included language in Section 57a which stated that "no act done by [the debtor] shall be deemed fraudulent" unless proven otherwise; he believed this showed clear Congressional intent for debtors who were unable to pay their obligations through no fault of their own should still receive protection from creditors under bankruptcy law. In conclusion, Justice Field argued against the majority's decision and urged them instead consider how best uphold Congress' original intention with regards to Section 57a and its protections for debtors facing financial hardship outside of their control