In Morgan & Another v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the United States had the right to seize a vessel and its cargo for violating the Neutrality Act of 1794. The vessel, the "Morgan," was owned by two British citizens and had been seized by the United States for attempting to transport arms and ammunition to the island of Cuba, which was then under Spanish rule. The Supreme Court held that the United States had the right to seize the vessel and its cargo. The Court reasoned that the Neutrality Act of 1794 was a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce and that the United States had the right to enforce the Act. The Court also held that the seizure of the vessel and its cargo was a valid exercise of the President's power to enforce the laws of the United States. The Court's decision in Morgan & Another v. United States established that the United States had the right to enforce the Neutrality Act of 1794 and to seize vessels and their cargo for violating the Act. The decision also established that the President had the power to enforce the laws of the United States.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Morgan & Another v. United States, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both law and equity. He argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced according to its terms, regardless of any subsequent changes in circumstances or laws which may have occurred since it was made. In this case, he noted that the government had agreed to pay certain sums for services rendered by Morgan and his partner before they were required by law to do so; thus, their agreement should still be honored despite any intervening legislation requiring them to perform such services without compensation. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that if Congress intended otherwise when passing said legislation then it would have explicitly stated as much within its text - something which it did not do here. As such, he concluded that there was no legal basis for denying payment due under an existing contract simply because of a change in statute after-the-fact; instead justice demanded enforcement of what had been previously agreed upon between all parties involved.