In the 1990 case of Raymond J. Moskal, Sr. v. United States, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government by a 5-4 decision that federal jurisdiction was appropriate for prosecuting fraudulent schemes involving counterfeit securities under mail fraud statutes (18 U.S.C §1341). The defendant, Moskal, had been involved in a scheme to defraud car buyers and insurance companies through selling cars with altered odometer readings and falsified titles. He argued that his actions did not constitute "fraud" as defined by federal law because he only created false documents rather than making false statements himself; therefore it should be considered a state crime instead of a federal one. The court disagreed with this argument stating that creating and distributing counterfeit security certificates constituted deception which is covered under mail fraud statutes even if no direct misrepresentation was made by him personally. This ruling expanded the scope of what could be prosecuted federally under mail fraud laws.

In the dissenting opinion for Raymond J. Moskal, Sr. v. United States, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's interpretation of "falsely made" in 18 U.S.C § 2314 was overly broad and inconsistent with its historical meaning. He contended that a document is only "falsely made" when its creation pretends to be something it is not - such as a counterfeit bill pretending to be genuine currency or a forged signature pretending to be authentic - rather than when it contains false information but does not pretend to be anything other than what it actually is (like an accurately created certificate containing incorrect data). In his view, this distinction matters because Congress intended for § 2314 specifically target counterfeiting and forgery crimes; expanding its scope would criminalize conduct beyond these specific offenses without clear legislative intent supporting such expansion.