Term: 2015
Docket: 14-1095
Musacchio v. United States
- Pro
14-1095 MUSACCHIO V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 590 Fed. Appx. 359 CERT. GRANTED 6/29/2015 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Whether the law-of-the-case doctrine requires the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case to be measured against the elements described in the jury instructions where those instructions, without objection, require the government to prove additional or more stringent elements than do the statute and indictment? 2. Whether a statute-of-limitations defense not raised at or before trial is reviewable on appeal? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 13-11294
In the case of Musacchio v. United States, Michael Musacchio, a former president of ETS (Exel Transportation Services), was charged with conspiracy to commit unauthorized access to protected computers and two counts of accessing protected computers without authorization. The charges were related to his alleged illegal access to his former employer's computer system after he left the company and started a competing business. At trial, the jury instructions incorrectly stated that the government needed only prove that Musacchio had conspired or acted "without authorization", rather than proving he exceeded authorized access as required by law. Despite this error favoring him, Musacchio was convicted on all counts in 2010. Musacchio appealed on grounds including an argument that evidence was insufficient because it did not show he exceeded authorized access; however, this claim came too late according to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(2). He also argued about incorrect jury instruction but Supreme Court ruled against him stating any error worked in his favor and didn't harm him. The U.S Supreme Court unanimously affirmed these convictions in January 2016 rejecting both arguments made by Mr.Musachhio.
In the dissenting opinion for Musacchio v. United States, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the majority's decision to uphold a higher standard of review for sufficiency challenges not raised at trial was incorrect. He contended that Rule 52(b) does not specify any standard of review and thus, it should be de novo (from new), rather than applying an elevated plain-error standard. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of precedent cases as supporting their position on this issue. He believed these cases did not establish such a rule but instead applied a harmless-error analysis or reviewed claims de novo when they were preserved by timely objection at trial. Therefore, in his view, there is no historical basis for imposing an elevated plain-error standard on unpreserved sufficiency claims.
