In the 1944 case of Muschany et al. v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled on a dispute over land valuation in relation to eminent domain proceedings during World War II. The government had seized farmland for military use and compensated owners based on its agricultural value rather than potential industrial or commercial worth. The plaintiffs argued that their compensation should reflect these higher values due to nearby industrial development and war-related demand for factory space, but lower courts disagreed. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, ruling that just compensation under the Fifth Amendment refers only to what an owner has lost, not what the taker gains; therefore it is irrelevant whether or not the government uses property more profitably after seizure. However, they also clarified that fair market value should consider all potential uses of a property which affect its price in open-market transactions - including possible future developments if there's reasonable probability at time of condemnation - rather than being limited strictly to current usage.

In the dissenting opinion for Muschany et al. v. United States, Justice Frank Murphy argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established principles of statutory interpretation and constitutional law. He contended that Congress did not intend to include within the scope of Section 17(a) (2) of the Surplus Property Act any transaction involving surplus property unless it was consummated by an officer or employee acting in his official capacity on behalf of a government agency. Furthermore, he believed that interpreting this provision as applying to private transactions would render it unconstitutionally vague because individuals could not reasonably understand what conduct is prohibited under such broad language. Additionally, Justice Murphy expressed concern about potential abuse and arbitrary enforcement if prosecutors were given wide discretion to determine which private transactions are subject to criminal penalties under this statute.