Nagle v. Rutledge was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The case arose when the petitioner, John Nagle, was convicted in a federal court for a crime committed in the state of Arkansas. After his conviction, Nagle sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted the writ, and the state of Arkansas appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Arkansas Supreme Court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with a federal court's decision. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be granted by a federal court. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the Arkansas Supreme Court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with a federal court's decision.

In Nagle v. Rutledge, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over a case involving an alleged breach of contract between two citizens of different states. The majority opinion held that the state court did not have jurisdiction because it lacked diversity among its parties and thus could not exercise authority under Article III of the Constitution. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that there were sufficient grounds for exercising federal judicial power in this case since both parties were citizens of different states and therefore met the requirements for diversity jurisdiction as set forth by Congress in Section 2 of Judiciary Act 1789. He further argued that even if one party was considered a citizen only within their own state, then they would still meet these jurisdictional requirements due to their domicile being outside said state's borders. Ultimately, Justice Field concluded that while he agreed with much of what his colleagues wrote on this matter, he felt compelled to dissent due to his belief that there existed sufficient grounds for exercising federal judicial power in this particular instance regardless if either party was deemed a citizen or non-citizen within their respective home states