Term: 2021
Docket: 21-439
Nance v. Ward
- Pro
21-439 NANCE V. WARD DECISION BELOW: 981 F.3d 1201 CERT. GRANTED 1/14/2022 QUESTION PRESENTED: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition. The questions presented are: 1. Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. 2. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 20-11393
In Nance v. Ward, the Supreme Court held that a state court's decision to deny an individual's motion for post-conviction relief was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The petitioner had argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present evidence regarding his mental health issues at sentencing. However, the Supreme Court found that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington in denying this claim because there was no reasonable probability that such evidence would have changed the outcome of sentencing proceedings given its limited mitigating value and potential aggravating effect on other aspects of his case. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling against granting post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to mental health evidence at sentencing proceedings.
EN In the dissenting opinion of Nance v. Warden, Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority opinion failed to properly consider the petitioner's claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence of his mental health issues at trial. She argued that the majority opinion failed to properly apply the Strickland standard, which requires a petitioner to show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the evidence of the petitioner's mental health issues, which could have been presented at trial, and that the petitioner's counsel's failure to do so was deficient. She argued that the petitioner's mental health issues could have been used to support a defense of diminished capacity or insanity, and that the petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to present this evidence. Justice Sotomayor concluded that the petitioner's claim should have been granted, and that the majority opinion failed to properly consider the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
