National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

Questions presented

SCOTUS records, cert granted 30 Jun 2025

A political party exists to get its candidates elected. Yet Congress has severely restricted how much parties can spend on their own campaign advertising if done in cooperation with those very candidates. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d). In an opinion by Chief Judge Sutton, a 10-judge majority of the en banc Sixth Circuit agreed that these so-called "coordinated party expenditure limits" stand in serious tension with recent First Amendment doctrine. App.10a-15a. It nevertheless upheld them as constitutional, both on their face and as applied to coordinated political advertising ("party coordinated communications"), believing the case to be controlled by FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (Colorado II). In doing so, the majority acknowledged that in the 23 years since Colorado II, this Court "has tightened the free-speech restrictions on campaign finance regulation," that "tension has emerged between the reasoning of Colorado II and the reasoning of later decisions of the Court," and that relevant facts have "changed, most notably with 2014 amendments" to the limits and "the rise of unlimited spending by political action committees." App.3a-4a, 11a. But it thought "any new assessment of the validity of the limits" remained this Court's "province, not ours." App.14a-15a. The question presented is: Whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications" as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.37.

Opinion summary

Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion

The dispute was over FECA limits on political parties’ spending when they coordinate with candidates. The petitioners argued those limits violate the First Amendment and that an older case upholding them should no longer control. Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the Court. The Court held that FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are unconstitutional. It said coordinated spending by parties is a form of protected political speech, and that the government’s anti-corruption interest is limited to preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The Court concluded the limits were not closely drawn because less speech-restrictive tools already exist, especially base contribution limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure requirements. It also held that the earlier precedent was no longer good law and overruled to the extent necessary.

Dissent summary

Etalia.ai summary of the dissenting opinions

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented. The dissent argued that for more than half a century Congress has used contribution limits and coordinated-expenditure limits to stop both actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption. It said coordinated expenditures let donors route money through parties to evade the candidate contribution limits, because the party can pay campaign bills that the candidate otherwise would have to pay. The dissent warned that striking down the coordinated-expenditure limits lets donors use parties as a way to bypass the basic limits and revive the corruption risks those limits were meant to prevent.