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07-499 NEGUSIE V. HOLDER DECISION BELOW: 231 Fed. Appx 325 CERT. GRANTED 3/17/2008 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prohibits the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General from granting asylum to, or withholding removal of, a refugee who has “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” INA § 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A). The question presented is: Whether this “persecutor exception” prohibits granting asylum to, and withholding of removal of, a refugee who is compelled against his will by credible threats of death or torture to assist or participate in acts of persecution. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 06-60193
The U.S. Supreme Court case Daniel Girmai Negusie v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General in 2008 revolved around the interpretation of immigration law concerning asylum seekers who may have been involved in persecution in their home countries. Negusie, an Eritrean national, was forced to serve as a prison guard where he participated involuntarily in persecuting others and later sought asylum in the United States fearing retribution if he returned home. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) bars granting asylum to individuals who have participated or assisted in persecution but does not specify whether this applies when participation is coerced rather than voluntary. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his application based on his involvement with persecution, regardless of coercion status; however, the Supreme Court ruled that it had erred by not considering whether involuntary actions should be treated differently under INA's bar provision for those involved with persecution.
In the dissenting opinion for Daniel Girmai Negusie v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Justice Thomas argued that the majority misinterpreted immigration law by ruling that a person forced to assist in persecution could still be barred from asylum or withholding of removal under U.S. law. He contended that Congress had made it clear in its wording of the statute that any assistance given in persecution, regardless of whether it was voluntary or coerced, should disqualify an individual from these protections. The intent behind one's actions is irrelevant; what matters is their participation in persecutory acts - even if they were compelled to do so under duress or threat of punishment.