In the case of Jonathan W. Nesmith and Thomas Nesmith v. Thomas C. Sheldon, Horace H. Comstock, David French, William E. Peters, James Forton, Atta E. Mather, Henry B. Holbrook Samuel P., Mead Francis E Eldred and Phebe Ann Dean Cullen Brown (collectively referred to as “the defendants”), the complainants sought a writ of mandamus against the defendants who were members of a board created by an act passed in 1845 for the purpose of selling certain lands belonging to Massachusetts which had been granted by Congress for educational purposes in 1790-1791 under what was known as The Land Grant Act or The Seven Ranges Act .The Supreme Court held that although it is true that this court has no jurisdiction over matters purely political or legislative yet when such matters are brought before them judicially they must decide upon their legality; but if there be any doubt whether they are judicial or political questions then it should be resolved in favor of its being judicial so far as to enable this court to exercise its power over them whenever necessary for effectuating justice between parties litigant.. Therefore ,the Supreme Court concluded that since there was no dispute about title nor possession involved here ,it could not entertain jurisdiction on behalf of either party and thus dismissed both complaints with costs

In the case of Jonathan W. Nesmith and Thomas Nesmith v. Thomas C. Sheldon et al, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a deed given by Jonathan W. and Thomas Nesmith to Cullen Brown in 1845 was valid or not. The majority opinion found that it was invalid because it had been obtained through fraud, but Justice McLean dissented from this decision on two grounds: firstly, he argued that there were no facts presented which showed any fraudulent intent on behalf of either party; secondly, he argued that even if some kind of fraud had occurred, the statute of limitations should have barred any action against the deed since more than three years had passed since its execution in 1845 until it came before court in 1849. Ultimately Justice McLean concluded that under these circumstances there was insufficient evidence for a finding against either party and thus urged reversal of judgment so as to allow both parties their rights according to law without prejudice or favoritism towards either side