In Newton v. Commissioners, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state statute that authorized the creation of a board of commissioners to assess and collect taxes was constitutional. The Court held that the statute was constitutional, as it did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case arose when the state of Indiana passed a statute that authorized the creation of a board of commissioners to assess and collect taxes. The statute provided that the board would be composed of three members, appointed by the governor, and that the board would have the power to assess and collect taxes. The statute also provided that the board would have the power to issue bonds to finance the collection of taxes. The plaintiff, Newton, argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court disagreed, holding that the statute did not violate the due process clause. The Court reasoned that the statute provided for a fair and reasonable method of assessing and collecting taxes, and that the board of commissioners was properly constituted and had the power to issue bonds to finance the collection of taxes. The Court concluded that the statute was constitutional, and that the board of commissioners had the power to assess and collect taxes. The Court also held that the board of commissioners had the power to issue bonds to finance the collection of taxes.

In Newton v. Commissioners, the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether a tax imposed by the state of Ohio on certain railroad companies violated the Constitution's Contract Clause. The majority opinion held that it did not violate this clause because there were no existing contracts between these railroads and Ohio at the time of taxation, so they could not be impaired. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that although there may have been no formal contract in place when taxes were levied against these railroads, an implied contract existed due to prior agreements made between them and Ohio regarding their obligations to pay taxes for using public roads within its borders. He further argued that any subsequent changes or modifications to those terms should only be done through mutual agreement rather than unilateral action taken by one party alone; thus he concluded that levying such a tax without consent constituted an unconstitutional impairment of contractual rights under Article I Section 10 of the U.S Constitution