In the case of Ngiraingas et al. v. Sanchez et al., residents of Guam brought a lawsuit against local and federal officials, alleging that they had violated their Fourth Amendment rights by conducting illegal searches and seizures. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which allows for suits against the U.S government for certain torts committed by federal employees in the course of their employment. However, this act does not extend to "territorial" governments or its officers. The Supreme Court held that neither Guam nor its officers were considered part of the "federal government" as defined under FTCA; hence, they could not be sued under it. The court reasoned that while territories are controlled by Congress, they do not constitute agencies or establishments within the meaning intended in FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. Therefore, even though these territories may receive significant support from federal funds and follow many federal laws, they maintain separate political identities with locally elected governors and legislatures responsible to their constituents rather than any branch of U.S Government directly.

In the dissenting opinion for NGIRAINGAS et al. v. SANCHEZ et al., Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, argued that the majority's interpretation of "person" in 42 U.S.C §1983 was too narrow. They contended that this law should apply to territories such as Guam because they are considered persons under other federal laws and have been treated as such historically by Congress and courts alike. The dissent also pointed out that excluding territories from §1983 would leave them without a crucial civil rights protection against territorial officials who violate their constitutional rights - a situation which contradicts the intent of Congress when it extended Bill of Rights protections to these areas. Furthermore, they criticized the majority's reliance on an analogy with municipalities' immunity from suit under §1983, arguing instead for an approach based on statutory language and legislative history rather than analogies.