In the 1956 case Nilva v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled on a matter involving tax evasion and fraud. The defendant, Nilva, was accused of evading taxes by underreporting income from his liquor business during World War II. He argued that he had been entrapped because government agents encouraged him to sell alcohol at inflated prices due to wartime rationing restrictions. However, the court rejected this argument stating that entrapment occurs when an innocent person is induced into committing a crime they would not have otherwise committed; it does not apply when someone is predisposed to commit such crimes regardless of government influence or involvement. Therefore, even if government agents did encourage higher pricing (which wasn't proven), this wouldn't constitute entrapment as Nilva was already willing and able to engage in fraudulent activities for personal gain.

In the dissenting opinion for NILVA v. UNITED STATES, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold Nilva's conviction under Section 2(c) of the Elkins Act was incorrect. The dissenting justices believed that this section only applied to situations where a person had received rebates or concessions in violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission order; they did not believe it could be used as a general prohibition against all forms of bribery and corruption involving interstate commerce. They also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "thing of value" within this context, arguing that such broad interpretation would make many ordinary business transactions potentially criminal offenses under federal law. Furthermore, they contended that if Congress intended for such wide-ranging implications, it should have been more explicit in its wording rather than leaving room for judicial interpretations which may overstep legislative intent.