Nimick v. Coleman was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a county court. The plaintiff, Nimick, had requested a writ of mandamus from the state court to compel the county court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to release a prisoner. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court reasoned that the state court did not have the power to issue a writ of mandamus to the county court because the county court was a court of limited jurisdiction. The Supreme Court noted that the state court had the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, but not a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court also noted that the state court had the power to review the decision of the county court, but not to issue a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court concluded that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the county court. The Supreme Court held that the state court had the power to review the decision of the county court, but not to issue a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court also noted that the state court had the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, but not a writ of mandamus.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Nimick v. Coleman, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to a great deal of confusion. He argued that under existing law, when an individual has been wrongfully dispossessed of their property by another party, they are entitled to recover damages from them for any losses suffered as a result of this wrongful act. The majority had held that such damages could not be recovered if the defendant had acted in good faith and without malice or negligence; however Justice Field maintained that this interpretation was incorrect since it did not take into account all relevant factors which should be considered when determining whether someone is liable for damages caused by their actions. Furthermore, he noted that allowing defendants who have acted with good faith but still caused harm to escape liability would create an unjust situation where those who suffer injury due to another's negligence cannot seek recompense for their losses.