Norwich Transportation Company v. Flint was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1871. The case involved a dispute between the Norwich Transportation Company and the Flint family over a contract for the transportation of goods. The Flint family had contracted with the Norwich Transportation Company to transport goods from New York to Michigan. The contract stated that the Flints would pay the transportation company a certain amount of money for the service. However, the Flints failed to pay the full amount due to the company, and the company sued them for the unpaid balance. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Norwich Transportation Company, finding that the contract was valid and enforceable. The Court held that the contract was binding on both parties and that the Flints were liable for the unpaid balance. The Court also held that the contract was not voidable due to any lack of consideration, as the Flints had received the benefit of the transportation services. The Court also noted that the contract was not unconscionable, as the terms of the contract were fair and reasonable. In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Norwich Transportation Company, finding that the contract was valid and enforceable and that the Flints were liable for the unpaid balance. The Court held that the contract was binding on both parties and that the Flints had received the benefit of the transportation services.

In the case of Norwich Transportation Company v. Flint, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an action brought by a foreign corporation against citizens of another state. The majority opinion held that it did not have such jurisdiction and dismissed the suit. However, Justice Field dissented from this decision on two grounds: firstly, he argued that Congress had granted states broad authority to regulate corporations operating within their borders; secondly, he maintained that there were no constitutional impediments preventing states from exercising such power in cases involving foreign corporations as well as domestic ones. He concluded his dissent by stating that if Congress intended for states to be prohibited from exercising their powers with respect to foreign corporations then they should make this clear through legislation rather than relying on judicial interpretation of existing laws or constitutional provisions.