In the case of Joseph Roger O'Dell, III v. J.D. Netherland, Warden et al., 1996, O’Dell was convicted for rape and murder in Virginia and sentenced to death. He appealed his sentence on the grounds that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel during sentencing because his lawyer failed to present mitigating evidence about his background. Additionally, he argued that the jury instructions were constitutionally flawed as they did not clearly state that jurors need not unanimously agree on a particular mitigating circumstance before considering it in their final decision-making process regarding imposition of a death penalty or life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court ruled against him by a vote of 5-4 stating there was no constitutional requirement for such an instruction unless there is ambiguity which could cause jurors to believe unanimity is required; this wasn't found applicable in this case. The court also held that any deficiency in representation didn’t prejudice O’Dell’s defense since substantial aggravating evidence existed justifying capital punishment.

In the dissenting opinion for Joseph Roger O'Dell, III v. J.D. Netherland, Warden et al., Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision to deny habeas corpus relief was based on a flawed interpretation of federal law and an incorrect application of procedural rules. He contended that O’Dell had presented compelling evidence suggesting his innocence which should have been considered by a jury in light of new DNA testing technology not available during his original trial. Furthermore, he criticized the majority’s reliance on procedural default as grounds for denying relief without considering whether this would result in fundamental unfairness or miscarriage of justice given the potential implications for O’Dell’s constitutional rights to due process and fair trial under Sixth Amendment. The dissent also expressed concern about how such rulings could undermine public confidence in judicial system if courts were seen as prioritizing technicalities over substantive justice.