Ogden v. County of Daviess was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a county could be held liable for damages caused by a defective bridge. The plaintiff, Ogden, was injured when his horse and wagon fell through a bridge that had been built by the county. Ogden sued the county for damages, arguing that the county was liable for the defective bridge. The Supreme Court held that the county was liable for the damages caused by the defective bridge. The Court reasoned that the county had a duty to maintain the bridge in a safe condition, and that the county had breached that duty by failing to repair the bridge. The Court also held that the county was liable for the damages caused by the defective bridge, even though the county had not been negligent in its construction or maintenance of the bridge. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the county was liable for the damages caused by the defective bridge, and that the county had a duty to maintain the bridge in a safe condition. The Court's decision established that counties can be held liable for damages caused by defective bridges, even if the county was not negligent in its construction or maintenance of the bridge.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Ogden v. County of Daviess, arguing that the majority's decision was based on a misreading of Indiana state law. He argued that the statute cited by the majority did not apply to this case because it only applied when there were multiple judgments against one debtor and those judgments had been satisfied out of order. In this case, there was only one judgment against Ogden and no other creditors involved; thus, he argued that the statute should not be used as justification for denying him his right to recover costs from Daviess County. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that even if such a statute did exist in Indiana law at some point prior to 1877 (the date when Ogden filed suit), it would have expired due to its own terms before Ogden could file his claim for costs with Daviess County since all statutes are subject to expiration unless they are renewed or reenacted by subsequent legislation. Therefore, Justice Field concluded that under both existing laws and principles of equity established by common law courts throughout history, Ogden should be allowed recovery of his costs from Daviess County despite their failure to pay them within two years as required by state law.