The U.S. Supreme Court case Ohio Bureau of Employment Services et al. v. Hodory, 1976, revolved around the issue of unemployment compensation benefits for a worker who was laid off due to lack of work but later refused an offer to return because it included a reduction in wages and working hours. The court had to decide whether such refusal constituted "just cause" under Ohio law which would allow him to continue receiving unemployment benefits or if his refusal disqualified him from further benefits. In this case, John J. Hodory was laid off by his employer due to lack of work and began receiving unemployment compensation benefits from the state bureau (Ohio Bureau). Later on, he was offered reemployment at reduced wages and hours which he declined citing that acceptance would result in financial hardship. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr.Hodory stating that declining employment with substantially less favorable terms does not necessarily disqualify one from continuing their unemployment compensation as per Ohio law's provision for refusing new work without just cause.

In the dissenting opinion for Ohio Bureau of Employment Services et al. v. Hodory, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the majority's decision to allow Mr. Hodory unemployment benefits was incorrect because it misinterpreted Ohio law and federal constitutional principles regarding due process rights in administrative proceedings. He contended that under Ohio law, a worker who voluntarily leaves his job without good cause is ineligible for unemployment compensation and thus, Mr.Hodory should not have been eligible as he left his employment voluntarily when he refused to accept a transfer within the company which would have required him to work on Sundays - an act against his religious beliefs but not considered "good cause" by state standards at that time. Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the majority's view that denying benefits violated Mr.Hodory’s right to free exercise of religion protected by First Amendment; instead asserting such denial did not impose any burden on practicing one’s faith but merely withheld a benefit from those unwilling or unable to meet statutory eligibility requirements. He concluded by expressing concern over potential implications of this ruling – suggesting it could lead states into providing exceptions based on individualized assessments of religious convictions thereby creating undue burdens upon their administrative systems while potentially fostering inequality among claimants seeking similar benefits under different circumstances.