The U.S. Supreme Court case O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1993 revolved around the question of whether federal common law or state law should govern the imputation of knowledge from officers to a corporation in suits brought by FDIC as receiver. The FDIC sued O'Melveny & Myers, alleging that they negligently failed to uncover fraud committed by American Diversified Savings Bank's (ADSB) officers during their legal representation of ADSB. The firm argued that since ADSB’s management was involved in the fraudulent activity, their knowledge should be attributed to the bank and thus bar FDIC’s claims due to contributory negligence under California law. However, lower courts applied federal common law which did not recognize such defense for receivers like FDIC. The Supreme Court reversed these decisions stating there is no significant federal interest justifying creation of a special federal rule regarding imputation of knowledge and held that state laws apply unless there is explicit statutory guidance otherwise or if application would frustrate specific objectives of federal legislation.

The dissenting opinion in the case of O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) argued that federal common law, not state law, should govern the liability of attorneys who allegedly participated in their client's fraud. The dissenters believed that when a federal agency like FDIC steps into the shoes of a failed financial institution and sues its former lawyers for malpractice or aiding and abetting fraud, it is acting under an express or implied mandate from Congress to enforce certain federally created rights. Therefore, they contended that such lawsuits are essentially federal in nature and thus governed by federal common law rather than state tort principles. They also expressed concern about potential inconsistency if different states' laws were applied to similar cases involving national banks across various jurisdictions.