Oregon Railway and Navigation Company v. Oregonian Railway Company, Limited was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1910. The case involved a dispute between two railway companies over the right to operate a railway line in Oregon. The Oregon Railway and Navigation Company (OR&N) had been operating a railway line in the state since 1883, while the Oregonian Railway Company, Limited (ORC) had been granted a charter in 1887 to build a railway line in the same area. OR&N argued that ORC's charter was invalid because it was granted after OR&N had already established its railway line. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of OR&N, finding that ORC's charter was invalid because it was granted after OR&N had already established its railway line. The Court held that ORC's charter was in violation of the Oregon Constitution, which prohibited the granting of charters for the same purpose after a railway line had already been established. The Court also held that OR&N had acquired a vested right to operate its railway line, and that ORC's charter was invalid because it interfered with OR&N's vested right. The Court's decision in this case established the principle that a state cannot grant a charter for the same purpose after a railway line has already been established. This principle has been applied in numerous cases since then, and is still used today to determine the validity of charters granted by states.

In the dissenting opinion of Oregon Railway and Navigation Company v. Oregonian Railway Company, Limited, Justice Brewer argued that the majority’s decision was wrongfully based on a technicality rather than an examination of the facts. He believed that it should have been clear to all parties involved in this case that there had been an agreement between both companies regarding their respective rights over certain railway lines; however, due to a lack of evidence proving such an agreement existed, the majority decided against enforcing it. Furthermore, he noted how this decision would be detrimental for both companies as they were already operating under these terms with no issues prior to litigation being brought forward by either party. In conclusion, Justice Brewer felt strongly about his dissent and urged for further consideration into whether or not such agreements should be enforced despite any potential legal technicalities which may arise from them.