Ormsby v. Webb was a Supreme Court case that was decided in 1845. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of land in the state of Ohio. The plaintiff, Ormsby, had entered into a contract with the defendant, Webb, to purchase a tract of land in Ohio. The contract provided that the purchase price was to be paid in installments over a period of time. Ormsby had paid the first installment, but Webb refused to accept the remaining payments and refused to convey the land to Ormsby. Ormsby then brought suit against Webb in the Supreme Court of Ohio, claiming that Webb had breached the contract and was liable for damages. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the contract was valid and enforceable, and that Webb was liable for damages. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, holding that the contract was valid and enforceable and that Webb was liable for damages. The Court also held that the contract was binding on both parties and that Webb was not entitled to any set-off or counterclaims against Ormsby. The Court further held that the contract was not voidable due to any lack of consideration or fraud. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the contract between Ormsby and Webb was valid and enforceable, and that Webb was liable for damages for breaching the contract.

In the case of Ormsby v. Webb, Justice Harlan delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that under Missouri law, an executor has no authority to sell real estate without first obtaining court approval. The majority had held that such authority existed because it found there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of implied power from the will itself. However, Justice Harlan disagreed with this conclusion and instead asserted that any sale must be approved by a court before being validly executed according to Missouri law. Furthermore, he noted that even if such implied powers did exist within the will itself they could not override existing state laws governing executors' duties and responsibilities when it comes to selling real property assets owned by an estate or trust fund. In conclusion, Justice Harlan believed strongly enough in his dissent against the majority opinion on this matter so as to urge reversal of their ruling for failing to adhere strictly enough with established legal precedent regarding executor rights in regards to selling real property assets owned by estates or trusts funds under Missouri law