In the case of Jose Antonio Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 1992, Ortega-Rodriguez was initially indicted for drug offenses in Florida but fled to California before his trial could commence. He was subsequently arrested and convicted on unrelated charges in California and served a prison sentence there. After completing his sentence in California, he was transported back to Florida where he faced the original drug charges that had been pending against him prior to his flight from the state. Ortega-Rodriguez argued that this delay violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S Constitution because it took nine years from indictment until trial due to him being held on other charges out-of-state during part of this time period. The Supreme Court ruled against Ortega-Rodriguez stating that delays caused by a defendant's own actions (in this case fleeing jurisdiction) do not violate their constitutional rights as they are self-inflicted. The court further clarified that only those delays which are purposefully caused or acquiesced by government officials can be considered as violating an individual's right to a speedy trial.

In the dissenting opinion for Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, Justice Blackmun argued that a defendant's flight from prosecution should not be considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing unless it directly relates to the crime of conviction. He contended that considering such unrelated conduct would violate the principle of proportionality, which requires punishment to fit only with the crime committed and not any other unrelated actions by the defendant. Furthermore, he pointed out inconsistencies in how different jurisdictions handle this issue and emphasized on maintaining uniformity across federal courts. Lastly, he expressed concern over potential misuse or overuse of this rule by prosecutors who might use it as leverage during plea negotiations.