In the case of Oscar Gruss & Son v. United States et al., 1966, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a taxpayer could deduct losses from sales of securities as ordinary losses rather than capital losses under Section 117(g) (now Section 1231) of the Internal Revenue Code. The petitioner, Oscar Gruss & Son, argued that they were not "dealers" in securities but rather "traders", and thus their transactions should be considered part of a trade or business. However, the court ruled against them stating that even if they were traders and not dealers in securities, it would still be necessary for them to demonstrate that these sales constituted an integral part of their business operations before such deductions could be allowed. This ruling clarified how tax laws apply to different types of investment activities.

In the dissenting opinion for Oscar Gruss & Son v. United States, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold a tax assessment against the company was incorrect. The dissenting justices believed that there were significant issues with how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had calculated its assessment of taxes owed by Oscar Gruss & Son. They contended that these calculations did not accurately reflect what should have been considered as taxable income and disagreed with how certain deductions were handled in this case. Furthermore, they expressed concerns about potential implications of this ruling on future cases involving similar circumstances, fearing it could set an unfavorable precedent for businesses facing tax assessments from IRS.