In Osterneck et al. v. Ernst & Whinney, 1988, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a motion for discretionary prejudgment interest is to be considered as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The case arose when petitioners filed suit against Ernst & Whinney alleging securities fraud and negligence in auditing financial statements. After winning their claim but being denied prejudgment interest by the District Court, they appealed this decision while simultaneously filing a post-judgement motion for discretionary prejudgment interest at the district court level which was also denied. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether such an appeal could be made concurrently with a post-judgement motion at district court level without it being deemed untimely according to federal rules governing civil procedure appeals timelines. In its ruling, SCOTUS held that since motions for discretionary prejudgment interests involve reconsideration of matters encompassed in decisions on merits affecting final judgments; they are effectively motions altering/amending judgement hence must follow rule 59(e)’s timeline provisions.

In the dissenting opinion for Osterneck et al. v. Ernst & Whinney, Justice White disagreed with the majority's view that a motion for discretionary prejudgment interest should be considered a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). He argued that such an interpretation was inconsistent with both the language and purpose of Rule 59(e), which is intended to provide relief from judgments in situations where there are errors of law or fact, not when additional claims are made post-judgment. According to him, treating motions for prejudgment interest as falling within this rule would unnecessarily delay finality in litigation by extending deadlines for appeal until after these motions have been resolved. Instead, he suggested that they should be treated separately from other post-trial motions and not affect timelines for appeals.