Term: 2019
Docket: 19-267
Our Lady Of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-berru
- Pro
19-267 OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL V. MORRISSEY-BERRU DECISION BELOW: 769 Fed.Appx. 460 CONSOLIDATED WITH 19-348 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT PRESS RELEASE OF MARCH 16, 2020 IN KEEPING WITH PUBLIC HEALTH PRECAUTIONS RECOMMENDED IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19, THE SUPREME COURT IS POSTPONING THE ORAL ARGUMENTS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR THE MARCH SESSION. PRESS RELEASE OF APRIL 13, 2020 RESCHEDULED FOR ORAL ARGUMENTS BY TELEPHONE CONFERENCE. THE JUSTICES AND COUNSEL WILL ALL PARTICIPATE REMOTELY. CERT. GRANTED 12/18/2019 QUESTION PRESENTED: The First Amendment's Religion Clauses forbid government interference in a religious group's selection of its ministerial employees. The federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort have long agreed that the key to determining ministerial status is whether an employee performed important religious functions. This Court's unanimous 2012 ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC was consistent with that existing analytical consensus, and other circuits and states since 2012 have continued to rely on it. Yet the Ninth Circuit has now twice ruled that, under Hosanna-Tabor, important religious functions alone can never suffice-those functions must always be accompanied by considerations such as a religious title or religious training in order to demonstrate ministerial status. The question presented is: Whether the Religion Clauses prevent civil courts from adjudicating employment discrimination claims brought by an employee against her religious employer, where the employee carried out important religious functions LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 17-56624
The U.S. Supreme Court case, Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2019), centered around the "ministerial exception" to employment discrimination laws, which exempts religious institutions from certain anti-discrimination measures in hiring for roles that are essentially religious. The plaintiffs were two teachers at Catholic schools who alleged they had been victims of age and disability discrimination respectively. However, their employers argued that the ministerial exception applied because their roles included important religious functions such as teaching religion classes and leading students in prayer. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the teachers, stating that they did not have titles or training associated with clergy so could not be considered ministers under law. However, on appeal by the schools involved, a 7-2 majority at the Supreme Court reversed this decision arguing it was error to focus solely on an employee's title or formal religious training when considering if someone is a 'minister'. Instead Justice Alito writing for majority stated courts should consider what an employee does for a church institution - here both taught religion daily and led students in prayer making them critical to carrying out church mission thus falling within ministerial exception.
In the dissenting opinion for Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the majority's ruling expanded the "ministerial exception" too broadly and could potentially infringe upon employees' rights to sue their employers for discrimination. She contended that this decision would allow religious institutions to discriminate freely under the guise of internal church decisions. The ministerial exception should apply only when an employee performs vital religious duties, she said, not simply because a worker carries out important functions at a religious institution as was decided in this case. By extending it beyond those who serve essentially as ministers, Sotomayor warned that many more workers might lose employment-law protections without sufficient justification.
