In Parker and Another v. The Judges of the Circuit Court of Maryland, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over a case involving citizens from different states. At issue was an action brought by two Virginia residents against three Marylanders in the Circuit Court of Maryland for debt collection. The plaintiffs argued that since they were not citizens or domiciliaries of Maryland, their suit should have been heard in federal court instead. In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that although diversity jurisdiction did exist under Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the Constitution, it only applied when all parties involved were citizens or domiciliaries from different states; as such, it did not apply to this particular case and thus could not be used as grounds for removal to federal court. Furthermore, because there was no other basis upon which removal could be granted at that time (i.e., no general federal question jurisdiction), then state courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over cases between non-citizens/non-domiciliaries from different states like this one and therefore must hear them first before any appeal can be taken up with higher tribunals such as those found within the U.S judicial system

In Parker and Another v. The Judges of the Circuit Court of Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the writs of error issued by the Supreme Court did not extend to judgments rendered in state courts. He reasoned that while Congress had given the Supreme Court authority to issue such writs for cases arising under federal law, it had not done so for those involving state laws. Furthermore, he noted that if this power were extended to state court decisions then it would be tantamount to allowing an appellate review over all judicial proceedings within a particular State - something which was beyond Congress' constitutional powers as outlined in Article III Section 2 of the Constitution. As such, Marshall concluded that any attempt by Congress or even by implication from its statutes could not confer on this court jurisdiction over matters arising out of State tribunals and thus his dissent was based upon both legal reasoning and constitutional principles.