Parks v. Booth was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court could issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The case involved a man named William Parks, who had been convicted in a federal court of counterfeiting and sentenced to five years in prison. Parks then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a state court, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional. The state court granted the writ, and Parks was released from prison. The United States government then appealed the state court's decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with a federal conviction. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for federal prisoners, and that the state court had no authority to grant it to a prisoner convicted in a federal court. The Supreme Court's decision in Parks v. Booth established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners convicted in federal courts. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and it remains an important precedent in the area of federal habeas corpus law.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Parks v. Booth, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that Congress had no authority to pass a law which would interfere with an individual's right to contract freely, as it did in this case when it passed a statute prohibiting individuals from entering into contracts for personal service lasting longer than one year without obtaining consent of two-thirds of their fellow employees. Justice Field further argued that such a law violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving individuals of their liberty without due process of law. Additionally, he noted that if Congress could pass laws like this one then they could also pass similar laws limiting other types of contracts or agreements between private parties - something which he believed would be unconstitutional and contrary to public policy. Finally, Justice Field concluded his dissent by stating his belief that since there was no evidence presented at trial showing any harm caused by allowing these kinds of contracts for personal services beyond one year, then there was no reason why such contracts should not remain valid under existing state laws governing them.