In the case of Parsons Steel, Inc., et al. v. First Alabama Bank et al., 1985, the U.S Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a bank could be held liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by one of its customers under federal law. The dispute arose when Parsons Steel accused First Alabama Bank of assisting in fraudulent activities conducted by one of their clients who owed money to Parsons Steel. The court ruled that there is no general or specific provision within federal law that imposes liability on those who aid and abet breaches of fiduciary duties unless they have control over or benefit from these actions directly. Therefore, as per this ruling, banks cannot be held responsible for such misconduct committed by their customers unless they are direct beneficiaries or exert control over the illicit activity.

In the dissenting opinion for Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank et al., Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 1962(c) of RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). He argued that this section should not be interpreted to require a distinct "person" and "enterprise," but rather it was intended by Congress to prevent individuals from using an enterprise as a vehicle for racketeering activity. This would include instances where corporations are both the 'persons' conducting affairs and also constitute the 'enterprises'. The majority’s view, according to him, unnecessarily narrowed down RICO's scope against corporate wrongdoing which contradicted its legislative intent. Furthermore, he criticized their reliance on United States v. Turkette in interpreting Section 1962(c), stating that they misread its implications regarding separate entities requirement under RICO statute.