Term: 2021
Docket: 20-979
Patel v. Garland
- Pro
20-979 PATEL V. GARLAND DECISION BELOW: 971 F.3d 1258 QUESTION PRESENTED: Petitioner Pankajkumar S. Patel checked a box on a Georgia driver's license application erroneously identifying himself as a U.S. citizen, even though Mr. Patel was eligible for a license regardless of his citizenship. When Mr. Patel later sought to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident, a divided panel of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied him relief, holding that he is inadmissible because he "falsely represented" himself as a U.S. citizen for a benefit under state law. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (6)(C)(ii). Rejecting the government's own position and that of nearly every other circuit, the en banc Eleventh Circuit, by a 9-5 vote, held that it lacked jurisdiction to review threshold eligibility findings for five major categories of discretionary relief from removal, such as whether Mr. Patel is inadmissible for mistakenly representing himself as a U.S. citizen. The Eleventh Circuit separately held, contrary to a precedential BIA decision, that Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) renders noncitizens inadmissible even if their misrepresentation of citizenship is immaterial to the government benefit sought. The questions presented are: 1. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) preserves the jurisdiction of federal courts to review a nondiscretionary determination that a noncitizen is ineligible for certain types of discretionary relief. 2. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), which renders a noncitizen inadmissible for "falsely represent[ing]'' oneself to be a U.S. citizen for a government benefit, applies to immaterial misrepresentations. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 17-10636 GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION ORDER OF JUNE 29, 2021 TAYLOR A.R. MEEHAN, ESQUIRE, OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. CERT. GRANTED 6/28/2021
In Patel v. Garland, the Supreme Court held that a federal court may review an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations even if those interpretations are not set forth in the Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations. The case arose when two individuals applied for asylum and were denied by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). They argued that USCIS had misinterpreted its own regulation regarding “credible fear” interviews, which is required for asylum seekers to demonstrate their eligibility for relief from deportation proceedings. The lower courts found that they could not review USCIS's interpretation because it was unpublished and thus outside the scope of judicial review under Chevron deference doctrine, which requires agencies to publish their interpretations in order to be subject to judicial scrutiny. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning and instead held that a federal court can still consider an agency's interpretation regardless of whether it has been published or not as long as there is evidence demonstrating what position the agency took on a particular issue at some point during litigation proceedings or other administrative processes related thereto.
In the dissenting opinion of Patel v. Garland, Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority opinion was wrong to deny the petitioners’ request for a stay of the district court’s order. She argued that the majority opinion failed to consider the petitioners’ likelihood of success on the merits of their case, which she argued was strong. She argued that the majority opinion also failed to consider the irreparable harm that the petitioners would suffer if the stay was not granted. She argued that the petitioners had a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their case, and that the district court’s order would cause them irreparable harm if it was not stayed. She argued that the majority opinion should have granted the stay, and that the petitioners should have been given the opportunity to present their case on the merits. She concluded by stating that the majority opinion’s decision to deny the stay was wrong and that the petitioners should have been given the opportunity to present their case on the merits.
