Patterson v. Lynde was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Patterson, was held in a federal prison in Illinois. Patterson sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of the Constitution. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the merits of the underlying conviction. The Court's decision in Patterson v. Lynde established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. The decision also clarified the scope of the writ of habeas corpus, and established that it could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the merits of the underlying conviction.

In the case of Patterson v. Lynde, the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether a contract between two parties that included an agreement to pay for services rendered in gold or silver coins was enforceable under federal law. The majority opinion held that such contracts were not enforceable because they violated public policy and interfered with Congress' power to regulate currency. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that there is nothing inherently wrong with private citizens entering into agreements involving payment in gold or silver coins as long as it does not interfere with Congress' authority over currency matters. He argued further that if Congress had intended to prohibit such contracts, it would have done so explicitly rather than leaving it up to the courts to determine what constituted valid contractual arrangements regarding money and payments.