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09-338 RENICO V. LETT DECISION BELOW:316 Fed Appx 373 CERT. GRANTED 11/30/2009 QUESTIONS PRESENTED: Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a habeas case, erred in holding that the Michigan Supreme Court failed to apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in denying relief on double jeopardy grounds in the circumstance where the State trial court declared a mistrial after the foreperson said that the jury was not going to be able to reach a verdict. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-2174
In the case of Paul Renico, Warden v. Reginald Lett (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether a defendant's constitutional right to avoid double jeopardy was violated when his first trial ended in a mistrial and he was retried and convicted. The initial trial judge declared a mistrial due to jury deadlock after only four hours of deliberation without any clear evidence that the jury was indeed unable to reach a verdict. In subsequent trials, Lett was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced accordingly. The Sixth Circuit Court granted habeas relief on grounds that there had been no "manifest necessity" for declaring a mistrial in the first instance, thus violating Lett's rights under Double Jeopardy Clause which protects against being tried twice for same offense. However, upon review by Supreme Court it held that Michigan courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law as determined by SCOTUS itself regarding double jeopardy clause; hence reversing decision made by Sixth Circuit court thereby upholding conviction from second trial.
In the dissenting opinion for Paul Renico, Warden v. Reginald Lett, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision to uphold Lett's conviction was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. She pointed out that a trial judge should declare a mistrial only as a last resort, when there is a manifest necessity for such action. In this case, she believed that no such necessity existed and thus disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that it did. The jury had been deliberating for just four hours after hearing two days of testimony and evidence in what was not an overly complex case; they had sent out one note indicating difficulty reaching consensus but hadn’t stated they were deadlocked or asked for further instructions from the court before being dismissed by Judge Giles prematurely according to Ginsburg’s interpretation of events.