Peete v. Morgan was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to enforce a contract that was made in another state. The case involved a contract between two parties, Peete and Morgan, in which Morgan agreed to pay Peete a certain amount of money for the sale of a tract of land in Alabama. Peete sued Morgan in a state court in Alabama to enforce the contract. Morgan argued that the contract was invalid because it had been made in another state and was therefore not enforceable in Alabama. The Supreme Court held that the state court had the authority to enforce the contract. The Court reasoned that the contract was valid and enforceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court noted that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of other states. Therefore, the Court held that the state court had the authority to enforce the contract. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court had the authority to enforce the contract between Peete and Morgan. The Court reasoned that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution required states to give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of other states. Therefore, the state court had the authority to enforce the contract.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Peete v. Morgan, arguing that the decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi should be affirmed. He argued that under Mississippi law, a contract for personal services was not assignable and therefore could not be enforced by an assignee. The majority had held otherwise, finding that such contracts were transferrable if there was no express prohibition against it in the original agreement between parties. Justice Field disagreed with this interpretation and found instead that any assignment would have to comply with state laws governing assignments or else it would fail as a matter of public policy. Furthermore, he noted that even if there had been no explicit prohibition against assigning such contracts in this case, they still could not be assigned because they involved personal services which are inherently non-transferrable according to established principles of law and equity. Thus, he concluded his dissent by urging affirmance of the lower court's ruling on these grounds alone without reaching other issues raised by either party before them