In the 1917 case Pendleton v. Benner Line, the United States Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving maritime law and contract interpretation. The plaintiff, Pendleton, chartered a steamboat from the defendant, Benner Line for transportation of goods. However, due to an accident that was not caused by either party's negligence or fault but rather by unforeseen circumstances (an "Act of God"), the boat could not complete its journey as planned. As such, Pendleton sought to recover his freight money under their agreement which stipulated he would only pay if delivery was completed successfully. The court held in favor of Benner Line stating that despite no explicit provision covering this situation in their contract; it is implied within maritime contracts like these that risks associated with navigation including those outside human control are assumed by charterers unless explicitly stated otherwise. Therefore even though delivery wasn't successful due to an Act of God event beyond anyone’s control; since there were no provisions exempting him from payment under such conditions in their agreement - Pendleton still had to pay for services rendered up until point where further performance became impossible.

In the dissenting opinion for Pendleton v. Benner Line, it was argued that the majority's decision to deny recovery of damages based on a technicality contradicted established legal principles and common sense. The dissenting justices believed that when a party breaches a contract in such an egregious manner as in this case, they should not be allowed to escape liability simply because their breach made it impossible for the other party to fulfill certain formalities required by law. They contended that allowing such an outcome would encourage bad faith behavior and undermine confidence in contractual relationships. Furthermore, they pointed out inconsistencies between this ruling and previous decisions of the court regarding similar matters, suggesting that there might have been some confusion or misunderstanding among the justices about how these principles should be applied.