Penfield v. Chesapeake, Ohio and South Western Railroad Company was a Supreme Court case that was decided in 1891. The case involved a dispute between the railroad company and a farmer, William Penfield, over the right of way of a railroad line. Penfield had purchased a tract of land in 1876 that was adjacent to the railroad line, and he claimed that the railroad had encroached on his land by building a fence and a trestle across it. The railroad argued that it had the right to build the fence and trestle because it had acquired the right of way from the state in 1871. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the railroad, finding that the railroad had acquired the right of way from the state in 1871 and that Penfield had no right to interfere with the railroad's use of the land. The Court held that the railroad had the right to build the fence and trestle, and that Penfield had no right to interfere with the railroad's use of the land. The Court also held that Penfield was not entitled to any compensation for the use of his land. This case established the principle that a railroad has the right to use its right of way for its own purposes, and that landowners cannot interfere with the railroad's use of the land.

In the dissenting opinion of Penfield v. Chesapeake, Ohio and South Western Railroad Company, Justice Harlan argued that the majority’s decision was an incorrect interpretation of the law. He believed that a railroad company should not be held liable for damages caused by its negligence if it had no knowledge or reason to believe such damage would occur. In this case, he argued that there was no evidence presented to show that the defendant knew or should have known about any potential danger posed by their actions in allowing cattle to cross over their tracks at certain times of day. Furthermore, he noted that even if they did know about such dangers, they could not reasonably be expected to anticipate all possible consequences from their actions since these were matters outside of their control and expertise as a railway company. Therefore, Justice Harlan concluded his dissent with an argument against holding companies liable for damages when they had no reasonable way of knowing what might happen due to circumstances beyond their control or understanding.