Joseph Pennock and Nathan F. Hart appealed a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio to the United States Supreme Court in 1859. The case involved an agreement between Pennock, Hart, and George S. Coe, Trustee of the Cleveland, Zanesville & Cincinnati Railroad Company (CZ&CRR). Under this agreement CZ&CRR was obligated to pay $10 per acre for land owned by Pennock and Hart that was necessary for construction of its railroad line through Muskingum County in Ohio. However, when it came time to make payment CZ&CRR refused on grounds that they had not received approval from their stockholders as required under state law at the time. The appellants argued that since they had already conveyed title to CZ&CRR before such approval was obtained then they were entitled to full payment regardless if it violated state law or not; however, both lower courts ruled against them stating that no contract could be enforced which contravened public policy established by statute laws passed by legislature with regards to corporate powers granted therein. Ultimately US Supreme Court affirmed these decisions finding no error in either court's ruling thus denying relief sought by appellants Joseph Pennock and Nathan F. Hart

In the case of Joseph Pennock and Nathan F. Hart v. George S. Coe, Trustee of the Cleveland, Zanesville, and Cincinnati Railroad Company, Chief Justice Taney delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the appellants had no right to bring their suit against Coe as trustee for damages resulting from an alleged breach of contract by his predecessor in office. He reasoned that since trustees are not personally liable for contracts made by their predecessors unless they expressly assume such liability upon taking office or ratify them afterwards, it was improper to hold Coe responsible for any wrongs committed prior to his appointment as trustee. Furthermore, Taney contended that even if there were evidence showing some kind of ratification on behalf of Coe after assuming office – which there was not – this would still be insufficient grounds to make him liable because it is well established law that one cannot ratify a voidable act without first making restitution or providing compensation for any injury caused thereby; thus rendering such ratification invalid under these circumstances.