Term: 2020
Docket: 19-438
Pereida v. Wilkinson
- Pro
19-438 PEREIDA V. WILKINSON, ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL DECISION BELOW: 916 F.3d 1128 PRESS RELEASE OF MARCH 16, 2020 IN KEEPING WITH PUBLIC HEALTH PRECAUTIONS RECOMMENDED IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19, THE SUPREME COURT IS POSTPONING THE ORAL ARGUMENTS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR THE MARCH SESSION. 4/13/2020: ARGUMENT TO BE RESCHEDULED FOR THE OCTOBER TERM 2020 CERT. GRANTED 12/18/2019 QUESTION PRESENTED: A noncitizen may not apply for relief from deportation, including asylum and cancellation of removal, if he has been convicted of a disqualifying offense listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The categorical approach (including its "modified" variant) governs the analysis of potentially disqualifying convictions. Under that approach, a conviction for a state offense does not carry immigration consequences unless it "necessarily" establishes all elements of the potentially corresponding federal offense. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-91 (2013). Accordingly, four courts of appeals hold that a state conviction does not bar relief from removal if the state-court record is merely ambiguous as to whether the conviction involved the elements of the corresponding federal offense. In their view, ambiguity means the conviction does not "necessarily" establish the elements of the federal offense. Four other courts of appeals-including the Eighth Circuit below-take the opposite view. They hold that a merely ambiguous conviction is nonetheless disqualifying because the immigration laws place an evidentiary burden of proof on noncitizens to establish eligibility for relief. The question presented is: Whether a criminal conviction bars a noncitizen from applying for relief from removal when the record of conviction is merely ambiguous as to whether it corresponds to an offense listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 17-3377
The Pereida v. Wilkinson case in 2020 revolved around Clemente Avelino Pereida, an undocumented immigrant from Mexico who had been living in the U.S for over 25 years. He was seeking to cancel his removal order under a provision of immigration law that allows nonpermanent residents to do so if they have been residing continuously in the country for ten years, are people of good moral character and their removal would result in exceptional hardship to a spouse, parent or child who is a U.S citizen or permanent resident. However, he had previously been convicted under Nebraska state law for criminal impersonation which involved using fraudulent documents to obtain employment. The Supreme Court ruled against him by stating that because it wasn't clear whether his conviction fell into categories of crimes involving 'moral turpitude', he failed to meet his burden of proof showing eligibility for relief from deportation.
In the dissenting opinion for Pereida v. Wilkinson, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, argued that the majority's decision was too restrictive in its interpretation of immigration law. They contended that a state conviction does not necessarily disqualify an individual from seeking discretionary relief under federal immigration laws unless it clearly matches a category of crimes listed as grounds for deportation. In this case, they believed Mr. Pereida should have been allowed to present his case for cancellation of removal because his crime (using false identification) did not clearly fall into one of those categories - particularly 'moral turpitude'. The dissent also pointed out practical implications: many immigrants may now be denied the chance to make their case due to minor convictions or even charges without convictions if courts cannot definitively categorize them under federal law.
