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13-1041 PEREZ V. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION DECISION BELOW: 720 F.3d 966 CONSOLIDATED WITH 13-1052 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2014 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., generally provides that "notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register," 5 U.S.C. 553(b), and, if such notice is required, the rulemaking agency must give interested persons an opportunity to submit written comments, 5 U.S.C. 553(c). The APA further provides that its notice-and--comment requirement "does not apply * * * to interpretative rules," unless notice is otherwise required by statute. 5 U.S.C. 553(b) (A). No other statute requires notice in this case. The question presented is: Whether a federal agency must engage in notice--and-comment rulemaking before it can significantly alter an interpretive rule that articulates an interpretation of an agency regulation. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-5246
In the case of Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2014 that federal agencies do not have to go through a formal rulemaking process before making significant changes to rules interpreting their own regulations. The court's decision overturned a previous ruling by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals which had held that any change in an agency’s interpretive rule must be subjected to notice-and-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation and stated that it was inconsistent with both APA text and longstanding practices of federal agencies, thereby allowing them more flexibility in changing their interpretations without public input or scrutiny.
In the dissenting opinion for Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's decision to allow federal agencies to interpret their own regulations without judicial review was a violation of separation of powers principles. He contended that this practice allowed executive agencies to both write and interpret laws, which is contrary to the Constitution's design where Congress writes laws and courts interpret them. Furthermore, he criticized what he saw as an excessive deference by courts towards administrative interpretations under Auer v Robbins (1997), arguing it undermines legal predictability and allows agencies too much leeway in shaping policy through reinterpretation of rules rather than going through proper rulemaking procedures. In his view, such unchecked power could lead to arbitrary government action or favoritism towards certain groups.