This Supreme Court case involved the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company (plaintiffs) suing Philip Quigley (defendant). The plaintiffs argued that they had a right to use their own property as they saw fit, including building fences along the railroad tracks. They also claimed that Quigley was trespassing on their land by cutting down trees near the fence line. The defendant countered that he owned some of the land in question and thus had a right to cut down any trees located thereon. After hearing both sides' arguments, the court ruled in favor of Quigley because it found no evidence that his actions constituted trespass or interfered with plaintiff's rights over its own property. Furthermore, since Quigley did not interfere with plaintiff's ability to use its property for legitimate purposes such as running trains or maintaining fencing around them, he could not be held liable for damages caused by his tree-cutting activities.

In the dissenting opinion of The Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company v. Philip Quigley, Justice Grier argued that the majority's decision was not supported by precedent or law. He noted that a contract between two parties is binding on both sides unless it can be proven to be illegal or fraudulent in nature. In this case, he believed there was no evidence presented to support such claims and thus the plaintiff should have been held liable for their contractual obligations as agreed upon with Mr. Quigley. Furthermore, Justice Grier stated that if a party fails to fulfill its contractual duties then they must face legal consequences regardless of any other circumstances surrounding the agreement; otherwise contracts would become meaningless documents without any real power behind them. As such he concluded his dissent by arguing against allowing one side out of an agreement simply because they had changed their mind after signing it due to unforeseen events beyond either party’s control